The thick snow, the biting cold, the barbed wire that draws a sharp line in the landscape. On this side is Europe: the largest space of peace, freedom and prosperity built on our continent after World War II. On the other side, just a few meters away, is Russia.<\/p>\n
The aggressor country that, on February 24, 2022, brought war back to Europe after decades. It is January 23, 2025 and I am in Lappeenranta, Finland. In these places the border is not an abstract concept. It is a physical barrier, made of fences, checkpoints, interrupted roads, broken economies. It is here that the geopolitical price of war is measured, every day.<\/p>\n
It was no accident that my first mission as Executive Vice-President of the European Commission started precisely from here, from the Union’s eastern border. In Finland, in the South Karelia region, overlooking a frontier that is now completely closed. A trip welcomed with typical Nordic reserve, with respect and pride, and also with a certain astonishment: a European commissioner who arrives from the deep south of Europe to listen to territories that have suddenly found themselves on the front line.<\/p>\n
It was not a courtesy visit. Nor a symbolic gesture. It was the very meaning of Cohesion Policy and my mandate: to go to the regions, not just to the capitals. To start from those that are suffering most. From those whose condition has plummeted overnight, when the Russian invasion of Ukraine forever changed the political geography of our continent.<\/p>\n
Since then I have directly visited several border regions: Grebneva in Latvia, Koidula in Estonia, Padvarionys in Lithuania, Bia\u0142owie\u017ca in Poland. Places different in history and size, but united by the same feeling: that of having passed, in a very short time, from quiet peripheries of the Union to strategic frontiers of Europe. Before the war these territories lived on exchanges, trade, tourism, cross-border cooperation. Today many of those flows have disappeared. Borders have closed, investments have stopped, economic activities have lost markets and prospects. Entire local development models \u2013 built for decades on geographical proximity \u2013 have suddenly become obsolete.<\/p>\n
In the regions on the eastern border, the war has produced a sharp reduction in investments, the collapse of commercial and tourist flows, new economic barriers and the loss of jobs. In many cases, these difficulties have been compounded by pressure related to the reception of Ukrainian refugees and the instrumentalization of migratory flows by Russia and Belarus as a form of hybrid warfare.<\/p>\n
But perhaps the most worrying data is the demographic one. Young people leave, families hesitate to stay, essential services become more fragile. Schools, transport, local healthcare: everything becomes more difficult when geopolitical uncertainty is added to structural weaknesses already present.<\/p>\n
During my meetings with mayors, regional administrators, businesses and representatives of civil society, one message emerged clearly: these regions are not asking for emergency assistance. They are asking for a perspective. They are asking not to be left alone to manage an epochal transformation they did not choose.<\/p>\n
The regions on the eastern border experience a unique convergence of critical issues, but also possess often undervalued assets: resilient human capital, natural heritage, strategic positioning, potential for dual-use infrastructures useful both for security and for civil development. For this reason, with the mid-term revision of Cohesion Policy, we have given member states and regions the possibility of using resources from the current programming for investments more consistent with new priorities. It is not surprising that many of these regions have chosen to orient interventions toward security, defense and competitiveness.<\/p>\n
The new European strategy for the regions on the Union’s eastern border, which will be on the agenda of the College of Commissioners on February 18, will be a further step to respond to the needs of these territories. Through a method based on listening: presence on the ground, direct knowledge of reality, construction of policies starting from concrete needs. Because the challenges of border territories do not emerge from national averages and cannot be addressed with standardized instruments.<\/p>\n
Policies built on territories, not imposed from above. Because what Latgale in Latvia needs is not identical to what Finnish Karelia or Polish Podlachia need. But all share the same geopolitical condition: being the external border of the European Union. And it is here that the question becomes fully political.<\/p>\n
The eastern border regions are not marginal peripheries. They are the front line of our security, our stability and our credibility as a Union. Their economic and social resilience is directly linked to the security of the entire continent.<\/p>\n
A fragile frontier is a vulnerable frontier. A frontier that empties out is a frontier that weakens. For this reason, supporting these regions is not only a choice of solidarity. It is a European strategic choice. It means guaranteeing citizens the right to remain in the place they call home. It means transforming the border from a fracture line to a space of European solidity.<\/p>\n
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine goes on. And with it the need to strengthen Europe where it is most exposed goes on either.<\/p>\n
The regions on the eastern border are not the borders of some member states: they are Europe’s borders. And as such they require a common, ambitious and lasting response. A strong and prosperous eastern border is an essential condition for protecting our entire continent.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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