{"id":6790,"date":"2026-03-06T01:05:47","date_gmt":"2026-03-05T23:05:47","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/foglioeuropeo.ilfoglio.it\/?p=6790"},"modified":"2026-03-06T16:47:59","modified_gmt":"2026-03-06T14:47:59","slug":"the-story-of-memorial-understanding-transformation-of-post-soviet-russia","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/foglioeuropeo.ilfoglio.it\/en\/the-story-of-memorial-understanding-transformation-of-post-soviet-russia\/","title":{"rendered":"The story of &#8220;Memorial&#8221;. Understanding transformation of post-soviet Russia"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>During Russia&#8217;s great war against Ukraine, which recently entered its fourth year, countless small things occur that barely make it into the media yet are no less important for understanding current events. In February 2026 it became known that the Moscow &#8220;State Museum of the History of the Gulag&#8221; is to be permanently dissolved. In November 2024, it was stated that it was merely closing temporarily for purely technical reasons \u2013 but that had already seemed hardly credible. This museum, opened in 2001, was an achievement of the broad anti-Stalinist movement in late Soviet times and in the early years of post-Soviet Russia under President Boris Yeltsin. The policy of the current leadership under Vladimir Putin \u2013 in power since 1999 and long since aimed at re-Stalinisation \u2013 has thus led not only to the destruction (&#8220;liquidation,&#8221; as it was termed in official Russian) of the well-known NGO &#8220;Memorial&#8221; in 2021\/22, but also to the end of the most important state museum dedicated to state terror in the USSR. It is no longer unthinkable that the mere mention of the Gulag and its victims may soon become an undesirable or punishable activity in Russia, on the grounds that it &#8220;blackens&#8221; the country&#8217;s history. How did all these events come about?<\/p>\n<p>The post-Soviet Russia&#8217;s turn towards consolidated dictatorship \u2013 unexpected for many observers \u2013 will undoubtedly remain the subject of numerous analyses for a long time to come. A book by the young Moscow historian Sergei Bondarenko offers important insights not only for specialists. He examines this political drift in connection with the failure of the internationally renowned NGO &#8220;Memorial&#8221; \u2013 initially Soviet, later Russian, and eventually international. The international society &#8220;Memorial&#8221; was founded in 1992; as an unofficial Soviet movement it had already existed since 1987. It was devoted primarily to the historical and moral reckoning with state terror in the Soviet Union. Its two main objectives were, on the one hand, to identify as many victims as possible, and on the other, to better understand the mechanisms of terror. &#8220;Memorial&#8221; was only partially able to fulfil both tasks, yet it produced groundbreaking findings like no other organisation in Russia. These include the database &#8220;Victims of Political Terror in the USSR,&#8221; which contains information on over three million victims \u2013 representing, by various estimates, between 10 and 60 percent of all people who were subjected to repression by the Soviet leadership.<\/p>\n<p>Bondarenko&#8217;s book, published outside Russia in 2025 under the title <em>Lost in Memory: The Society &#8220;Memorial&#8221; and the Struggle for the Past in Russia<\/em> \u2013 which is soon to appear in English and Italian as well \u2013 systematically examines how a spontaneous and initially broad social movement became a marginalised, persecuted group whose core was ultimately forced to leave Russia. At the outset of his work, Bondarenko recalls that by the end of the Soviet era, millions of its citizens knew little or nothing about what had happened to their ancestors and relatives who had been caught up in the machinery of the Gulag. The reform politics of <em>Perestroika<\/em> (1985\u20131991) opened up the possibility of finally speaking publicly about this ignorance. And the simple desire to clarify the fate of those who had disappeared in the Gulag drove the social forces to which &#8220;Memorial&#8221; owes its existence. Nearly forty years later, however, it must be said that all the information gathered about the victims of Soviet state terror and their fates in the Gulag did nothing to prevent a new terror regime from establishing itself in Russia. Bondarenko therefore allows himself a further, deeply painful question: what role did &#8220;Memorial&#8221; play in this development? And Bondarenko \u2013 who himself worked for many years as a young intern and later as a member of staff at &#8220;Memorial&#8221; \u2013 is surely right that &#8220;today, when one studies the history of state terror, one must study the history of &#8216;Memorial&#8217; itself,&#8221; for the failure of this NGO has itself become an important chapter in the history of state terror in Russia.<\/p>\n<p>In his study, written with great affection and respect for his older colleagues, Bondarenko reconstructs the political and moral traps into which &#8220;Memorial&#8221; activists fell. One of the most interesting points here is the specific relationship with the state that proved fatal to &#8220;Memorial&#8221;: the state itself was regarded as a suitable or even necessary partner in the struggle to come to terms with state terror \u2014 or rather, it was mistaken for one. Bondarenko attempts to explain this by noting that lustration \u2014 discussed in the 1990s but never realised \u2014 as well as the prosecution of the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB, dissolved at the end of 1991 into several intelligence services) as an organ of state terror, were viewed with suspicion by &#8220;Memorial&#8221; activists. They saw such measures largely as a continuation of political arbitrariness on a new level, and therefore rejected them as tools in their struggle to confront the Soviet past. Instead, they long placed their trust in the rationality of the new post-Soviet state and believed in its willingness to break with the past.<\/p>\n<p>At various points in his book, Bondarenko addresses &#8220;Memorial&#8221;&#8216;s na\u00efve belief that their own state could not be entirely corrupt. He describes the prevailing mindset within the organisation as follows: &#8220;The laws were bad, but they were still laws in force. The system had been perverted, but it had now somehow been corrected, which was why it needed to be preserved. The terror had been a mistake and a crime, but there were still real &#8216;enemies.&#8217; There simply had to have been. Didn&#8217;t there?&#8221; Paradoxically, it was above all a kind of patriotic attachment to their own state that prevented &#8220;Memorial&#8221; from rejecting it outright and from waging the struggle to confront state terror <em>against<\/em> that state, rather than <em>with<\/em> it. The &#8220;Memorial&#8221; activists set themselves the task of decoding the logic of state terror. Like no one else, they immersed themselves in Soviet archives, where they gained access to numerous documents, artefacts and eyewitness accounts. They should therefore have been able to see how mendacious the Soviet system was, and that its terrorist character was grounded in numerous practices of deception. &#8220;Memorial&#8221; dreamed of a different state, one that would no longer rely on an elaborate system of lies and manipulation. That dream blinded them so completely that they ultimately became victims of that very system.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Stalinism&#8221; as a phenomenon is far more complex than Stalin&#8217;s political biography and is not confined to his years in power (1923\u20131953). This is attested, for instance, by Lydia Chukovskaya (1907\u20131996) in her novella <em>Sofia Petrovna<\/em>. Written in the midst of the Great Terror in 1938, the novella vividly conveys the bewilderment in the face of state terror: how people blindly trusted their own executioners, how impossible it was to understand what was happening to the various &#8220;enemies&#8221; and those close to them, how helpless one was in the face of excessive, boundless lies. Chukovskaya, like many other contemporaries, recalled her astonishment decades later \u2013 not only at the height of the Stalinist state terror, but in the years that followed as well. Terror is incomprehensible in multiple respects, and this is one of its most effective weapons. Its incomprehensible and senseless character left remarkable traces in Russia&#8217;s political and social consciousness that have to this day scarcely been studied. This senselessness continues today, albeit in a new form. And the self-appointed mission of &#8220;Memorial&#8221; therefore remains urgently relevant, in a country which, as Bondarenko writes, &#8220;has not even begun to engage seriously with its own de-Stalinisation.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p><em>Anna Schor-Tschudnowskaja, sociologist and psychologist, teaches at the Faculty of Psychology at the Sigmund Freud University in Vienna.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>During Russia&#8217;s great war against Ukraine, which recently entered its fourth year, countless small things occur that barely make it into the media yet are no less important for understanding current events. In February 2026 it became known that the Moscow &#8220;State Museum of the History of the Gulag&#8221; is to be permanently dissolved. In [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":6890,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"iawp_total_views":167,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6790","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-senza-categoria"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/foglioeuropeo.ilfoglio.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6790","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/foglioeuropeo.ilfoglio.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/foglioeuropeo.ilfoglio.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foglioeuropeo.ilfoglio.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foglioeuropeo.ilfoglio.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6790"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/foglioeuropeo.ilfoglio.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6790\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6964,"href":"https:\/\/foglioeuropeo.ilfoglio.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6790\/revisions\/6964"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foglioeuropeo.ilfoglio.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/6890"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/foglioeuropeo.ilfoglio.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6790"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foglioeuropeo.ilfoglio.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6790"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foglioeuropeo.ilfoglio.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6790"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}