{"id":7620,"date":"2026-07-03T09:02:51","date_gmt":"2026-07-03T07:02:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/foglioeuropeo.ilfoglio.it\/?p=7620"},"modified":"2026-07-03T09:02:51","modified_gmt":"2026-07-03T07:02:51","slug":"the-alliances-european-pillar-did-its-homework-last-year-but-it-may-not-be-enough","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/foglioeuropeo.ilfoglio.it\/en\/the-alliances-european-pillar-did-its-homework-last-year-but-it-may-not-be-enough\/","title":{"rendered":"The Alliance&#8217;s &#8220;European pillar&#8221; did its homework last year, but it may not be enough"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><strong>The NATO summit and the unknowns over Europe&#8217;s security<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Reconvergence&#8221; between the United States and Europe, or a rupture in the transatlantic relationship at least until the end of Donald Trump&#8217;s term? The summit of NATO heads of state and government on July 7-8 will be a decisive test for relations within the Alliance. Europeans have done almost everything the American president asked of them. At last year&#8217;s summit in The Hague they accepted a commitment to raise defense spending to 5 percent of GDP (3.5 percent in actual military spending) by 2035. Over the past twelve months they have worked on the Trump Administration&#8217;s &#8220;NATO 3.0&#8221; project, through the Alliance&#8217;s &#8220;European pillar,&#8221; aimed at disengaging from the old continent, both in terms of troops and military capabilities. European concessions have gone well beyond NATO. The EU accepted a trade deal disadvantageous to itself with the United States in an effort to avoid a chaotic withdrawal from Europe&#8217;s security architecture at a time when the direct threat from Russia is becoming ever more pressing. The same question arises in Ankara. Sudden announcements by Trump or his defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, about withdrawing troops and defense systems from certain countries have created uncertainty. Europeans are asking the Administration for any withdrawal to be gradual, coordinated, and spread over the medium term, so they can compensate with European capabilities. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has kept up his campaign of flattering Trump throughout the year, often pushing past the point of looking ridiculous. The priority remains making sure the American president doesn&#8217;t effectively kill NATO and its deterrence. But everything risks hinging on Trump&#8217;s mood of the day. To avoid further potential opportunities for mishaps, NATO summits should move to a two-year cycle.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>Including the unknown of Ukraine<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Reconvergence&#8221; is the term Emmanuel Macron used after the G7 summit in Evian, considered a success because Donald Trump was persuaded to sign up to unprecedented commitments in support of Ukraine&#8217;s defense against Russian aggression. European countries \u2014 who coordinated ahead of the Ankara summit in the E5 format among France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Poland \u2014 want to avoid another betrayal by Trump on Ukraine. &#8220;In Ankara we want to send a strong signal of support for Ukraine,&#8221; said German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. Germany will propose &#8220;strong financing&#8221; for military supplies to Kyiv. Negotiations over Ankara&#8217;s final declaration are looking at a commitment to allocate tens of billions of euros a year in military aid. The war in Iran distracted Trump, easing the pressure on Volodymyr Zelensky to capitulate to the conditions set by Vladimir Putin. But the effects of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz on European economies have also fueled growing tensions between Trump and European leaders. The American president doesn&#8217;t like losers, and thanks to the progress Ukraine has made in deep strikes against Russia and in blocking the Russian advance on the battlefield, Volodymyr Zelensky no longer looks like the loser. Still, Trump is unpredictable. There are too many unknowns to predict success in Ankara.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>A list of options for sanctioning Israel<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>On Monday, July 13, EU foreign ministers will once again discuss potential sanctions against the Israeli government over the wars in Gaza and Lebanon, in what is proving to be one of the most recurring and most divisive issues among the twenty-seven. Attempts to reach unanimous agreement on sanctioning Benjamin Netanyahu&#8217;s extremist ministers \u2014 including Itamar Ben-Gvir, as requested by Italy over the treatment of Gaza Flotilla activists \u2014 have failed. A qualified majority could not be found even for the proposal to suspend the trade component of the EU-Israel association agreement, which would have raised tariffs on Israeli products. France and Sweden are now leading a group of countries calling for a ban on imports of products from illegal settlements in the West Bank. After resisting for months, Ursula von der Leyen&#8217;s Commission is expected to present a list of options to be discussed by foreign ministers. But no decision is expected from the Foreign Affairs Council. &#8220;A list of options is not a formal proposal,&#8221; an EU official explains.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>The Commission presents its review of the ETS<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The Emissions Trading System (ETS) is the cornerstone of the European Union&#8217;s climate policy. The &#8220;polluter pays more&#8221; principle is meant to encourage businesses to decarbonize through price signals. But the ETS, strengthened in the last legislative term with an accelerated phase-out of free allowances for energy-intensive industries, is putting pressure on the competitiveness of some companies. Italy, Poland, and much of Central and Eastern Europe would like to suspend the mechanism. That&#8217;s impossible, given opposition from Germany, France, and Spain. But on July 15 the Commission will present a review of the ETS intended to give some breathing room to certain businesses. Some adjustments have already been introduced. Von der Leyen&#8217;s main idea is an ETS investment &#8220;booster,&#8221; with a budget of 30 billion euros funded through 400 million allowances, aimed at financing decarbonization projects. But that won&#8217;t be enough. In all likelihood the Commission will propose maintaining and increasing the number of free allowances for energy-intensive industries. On the same day, the Commission will adopt its annual report on the rule of law. The last meeting of the College of Commissioners will be held on July 22. From that day on, the EU will enter its long summer break. Barring any sudden crises, the institutions&#8217; political activity will not effectively resume until September 1.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The NATO summit and the unknowns over Europe&#8217;s security &#8220;Reconvergence&#8221; between the United States and Europe, or a rupture in the transatlantic relationship at least until the end of Donald Trump&#8217;s term? The summit of NATO heads of state and government on July 7-8 will be a decisive test for relations within the Alliance. Europeans [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":7747,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"iawp_total_views":5,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-7620","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-senza-categoria"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/foglioeuropeo.ilfoglio.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7620","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/foglioeuropeo.ilfoglio.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/foglioeuropeo.ilfoglio.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foglioeuropeo.ilfoglio.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foglioeuropeo.ilfoglio.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7620"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/foglioeuropeo.ilfoglio.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7620\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":7783,"href":"https:\/\/foglioeuropeo.ilfoglio.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7620\/revisions\/7783"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foglioeuropeo.ilfoglio.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/7747"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/foglioeuropeo.ilfoglio.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7620"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foglioeuropeo.ilfoglio.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7620"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foglioeuropeo.ilfoglio.it\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7620"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}