A Jumbo European Council
A new approach to enlargement, a new Multiannual Financial Framework, support for Ukraine amid the direct threat from Russia, migration policy, competitiveness and China: the agenda for the European Council of 15–16 October is so packed it would take a week to untangle the issues EU leaders are facing. Instead, heads of state and government will have to try to work through them in little more than 24 hours. Every item is divisive. And there is another potential crisis looming. Donald Trump’s threat to ban diesel exports could further worsen the situation on energy markets. On top of sky-high prices, the EU could face shortages with serious consequences for the transport, fertiliser and agricultural sectors. With such a packed agenda, the risk is yet another postponement on issues that are key to the EU’s future. Two extraordinary summits are already scheduled for November, one of them dedicated to the new Multiannual Financial Framework.
On enlargement, the Commission will present the European Council with a set of proposals to make the accession process easier. But some countries are reluctant to press the accelerator, fearing a negative reaction from domestic public opinion.
On the new Multiannual Financial Framework — the EU’s 2028–34 budget — the twenty-seven are split in two: on one side, Germany and the other “frugal” countries are demanding cuts of “hundreds of billions” compared with the Commission’s original proposal of €1.8 trillion over seven years; on the other, the “friends of cohesion” are pushing for an ambitious budget that preserves the Common Agricultural Policy and cohesion policy. Faced with deadlock over the figures, European Council President António Costa wants to focus on new own resources — the taxes that fund the EU budget.
On Ukraine, Europeans face a budget shortfall that could undermine Kyiv’s ability to defend itself against Russian aggression. At the same time, they are grappling with a growing number of acts of sabotage and hybrid attacks by Moscow. Meanwhile, at a meeting of foreign ministers on 10 October, the EU is expected to announce the addition of more than 1,600 individuals and entities to its blacklist over their role in Putin’s war. On migration policy, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni will push for a new crackdown, including the possibility of suspending asylum procedures and proceeding directly to deportations in crisis situations such as the one in Ceuta. The two leaders have also rallied a group of more than twenty countries calling for the EU budget to fund “return hubs” — centres in third countries where deported migrants would be sent while awaiting repatriation. But they will run into resistance from Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez and French President Emmanuel Macron. The Commission is expected to present a new package of migration measures at the end of October. On competitiveness, the big dilemma will be China. A week before the European Council, Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič will travel to Beijing to call for rebalancing the trade relationship. If there are no tangible results, the EU has promised to respond. But how? A majority of member states want to strengthen trade defences. Spain advocates openness toward China. Germany remains undecided, wary of retaliation from Beijing.
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A Test for the Savings and Investments Union at Ecofin
The meeting of EU finance ministers on 9 October will test the political will of the twenty-seven member states to make real progress on the Savings and Investments Union. The Irish presidency of the Council has set itself the goal of reaching an agreement at Ecofin on the supervision of EU financial markets. This is an essential step toward their integration, one that should make it possible to mobilise €1.4 trillion in household savings for investment. The G6 group — Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Poland and the Netherlands — has also pledged to reach an agreement by October, with enhanced cooperation if not all member states sign on. Yet even within the G6 there are difficulties. Germany is asking for special exemptions because of its federal system. Italy insists on the need for risk-sharing. Outside the G6, Luxembourg is putting up fierce resistance, fearing it could lose its privileged status as a financial hub within the EU.
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An Arctic Strategy Ahead of the European Security Strategy
On 20 October, Ursula von der Leyen’s Commission is expected to present the new Arctic Strategy, intended to give the EU a stronger presence in this strategic region. Work on the document has been shaped by Donald Trump’s designs on Greenland, Iceland’s rejection, in a referendum, of resuming accession talks, and the constant threat posed to the region by Russia and China. The agreement between the United States and Denmark over Greenland should ease tensions with the longtime ally. But the territory under Danish sovereignty, and the Arctic more broadly, remain a key region for the EU in terms of natural resources, rare earths and shipping routes. The Commission president has signalled her wish to treat the Arctic as a neighbour rather than a distant region. Norway has put a request to the Commission: to drop its opposition, on environmental grounds, to the development of new oil and gas extraction projects in the Arctic. For now, Ursula von der Leyen has given no sign of being ready to give up the Arctic version of the Green Deal. The Commission is working alongside Kaja Kallas’s European External Action Service on what could be presented at the end of October or the beginning of November: the new European Security Strategy.
