Europe must become a “beacon of freedom,” a lighthouse, a symbol of liberty, repeats Kaja Kallas, High Representative for the foreign policy of the European Union, now that Donald Trump’s United States have abdicated from this role, closing radio and TV broadcasters, suspending international aid, turning inward, in a moment when it would instead be necessary to shout to the world that the West represents a refuge free from the violence of regimes. Kallas, former Estonian prime minister with very clear ideas, has always fought to make the European beacon brighter and more recognizable, this ambition is written in her personal history and in that of her country, Estonia, which shares a rugged border with Russia and suffered the Soviet occupation. No one has ever questioned Kallas’s skill and her clear support for Ukraine against Vladimir Putin’s aggression, but since the former prime minister became the head of European diplomacy and no longer a proud prime minister of the EU, her leadership shines less, works less. How is that possible?
The family atmosphere
Kaja Kallas has always been more popular abroad than in Estonia, but she made enormous, through determination, commitment, solidarity, this small country that is almost twice the size of Lombardy. In January 2022, when half the world said that Americans and British were hysterical and needlessly alarmist toward Vladimir Putin who had amassed thousands of troops at the border with Ukraine, Kallas’s government had already sent weapons to Kyiv. She explained that for Estonia, as for all the Baltic countries, that shipment was a matter of coherence: Russia is dangerous, the eastern front of NATO must be reinforced. By recounting the deportation of her grandmother and her mother, then a child, to Siberia—the cold, hunger and violence of the Soviet regime—Kallas defined her leadership and that of Estonia: “My grandparents lived through terrible things and taught me that it is always important to celebrate being alive.” At home—her maternal grandfather Eduard had been among the founders of the Republic of Estonia after the First World War and her father, Siim Kallas, was one of the builders of Estonian independence, former prime minister and former governor of the central bank—Kallas learned two other things: one must give their best in the hardest times and one can handle anything, even the most brutal thing, when one’s ideas are in order and goals clear. But this life lesson, within the workings of the EU, does not fully apply and risks becoming entangled, searching for shortcuts in the complex machinery of European decisions.
The first visible mistake
The criticism toward Kallas by European countries began in March and has to do with Ukraine and also, inevitably, with America. Trump has upended the basic paradigm of Western defense of Ukraine, namely: repelling Russian aggression is essential to maintaining the security—and freedom—not only of Ukraine, but of all of Europe. The American president even questioned the fact that the aggressor is Russia, he belittled the leadership of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky, insinuated that it was Kyiv’s European allies, along with former US president Joe Biden, who wanted to continue a war that cannot be won, because Russia is “twenty times” stronger. Above all, he reduced the conflict to a mere territorial issue, depressing the fundamental matter of the fight for freedom against violent tyrannies, and thus telling Europeans: you deal with it, it’s your continent, it’s your land, it’s your security. Faced with this withdrawal, the EU even redrew its political borders, built a coalition of the willing fed by the support and drive of countries outside the Union, like the United Kingdom and Canada, and is trying to find a way to save Ukraine and therefore Europe’s very future. Kallas proposed an aid plan to Kyiv that, in its initial designs, was worth between 20 and 40 billion euros to quickly shore up Ukrainian defense—the urgency is another trait of the High Representative’s rhetoric, who understands very well, unlike others, that the slowdown in support to Ukrainians is measured in numbers of deaths before lost territories—and which was based on solidarity between European countries: financial or in-kind contributions were distributed based on Gross National Income, which is what is used in the EU budget and which assumes that bigger economies pay more. The initiative was not well received, there were many criticisms, within a few days the amount of aid went from 40 billion to 5 and the rumor spread that the High Representative did not know at all how to handle her new post: it’s one thing to be prime minister of a small combative country, another to work with twenty-seven countries, to compare, smooth edges, persuade skeptics. It is a different job.
The extent of the threat
Beyond the methodological mistakes—little dialogue, closed meetings with more aligned countries, those of northeastern Europe—Kallas found herself in the darkest shadow cone of the European debate on the defense of Ukraine: the varying degrees of perception of the Russian threat. The geographic variable, however irrelevant when one speaks of values, has its weight: those who are closer to Russia, those who suffered Soviet occupation, those who see in their skies or seas the incursions of Russian warplanes or sabotage actions attributable to the Russians, feel more urgency for an active and determined collective defense. There is the exception of Hungary, of course, but Trump’s arrival and his framing of the Ukraine conflict as a European matter has helped give strength to the geographic variable. To this are added other factors, such as the internal political dynamics of each country and the presence of parties and movements that do not see Russia as an enemy and even consider the Russian isolation a mistake—mainly economic, but not only. And certainly the American disengagement that implies greater European involvement in defense, which many countries are not ready to accept. This shadow cone is damaging for European unity: if the threat is not shared, if those who believe Putin will not stop at Ukraine (much less at a piece of Ukraine) are seen as hysterical warmongers, then there can be no (necessary) collective response.
The method
There is also the fact that Kallas’s task is to find a compromise that suits all EU countries. Many, in European halls, whisper that for the former Estonian prime minister the war against Russia is a personal matter and that this makes her a mediocre mediator. The High Representative does not move well in the bodies where collective policy is decided, like Coreper, the body that prepares the Foreign Affairs Councils and the summits of heads of state and government, and according to some, she has no advisors aware of the fact that without strong mediation it is impossible to manage EU diplomacy. Once again, the geographic variable influences reactions toward Kallas: at the Munich Conference in February, during which US Vice President J. D. Vance made explicit the current distance between Europe and the United States by hacking away at the transatlantic relationship, the High Representative called an informal meeting of European foreign ministers to discuss this epochal change, but only eight countries showed up, always the usual ones, those from northern and eastern Europe. It seems Kallas struggles to create dialogue with the countries of southern and western Europe, as if she spoke a different language (the reluctant ones also take advantage of this a bit and accusing her of being too involved, not mediating enough, representative of a country strongly marked by its position and history often becomes an excuse for those who prefer to keep downplaying the threat). An article published by German newspaper Faz also noted that Kallas had changed the officials of the European External Action Service, effectively the European diplomatic corps, subtracting power—that is, presence—from the countries of the south and west, while at the same time narrowing consultations, as if she trusted only a small portion of the more than five thousand officials that make up the Service.
The president’s hand
When Ursula von der Leyen formed her new European Commission for the second mandate, in December of last year, she removed a series of powers from the External Action Service, creating a new Directorate-General for the Mediterranean, which extends to the Persian Gulf, and appointing for the first time a Commissioner for Defense, the Lithuanian Andrius Kubilius, responsible for industrial defense policy. But in the future White Paper on European defense presented by von der Leyen, there is no mention of the Eurobonds proposed by Kallas as a financial tool for European rearmament nor of the 100 billion euro fund of subsidies that the former Estonian premier had supported. There is, however, a mention of the Commission possibly becoming the purchasing center for weapons for member states, but this role is already carried out by the European Defence Agency under the direction of the External Action Service and the member states. Kallas therefore had to underline that the European Defence Agency will remain the only body in charge of joint procurement. During the discussions on the aid package desired by Kallas to help Ukraine—which was quickly reduced—von der Leyen, unexpectedly, announced the creation of a task force to coordinate military aid deliveries to Kyiv from member states and the EU. Once again, the European External Action Service had to clarify that aid to Ukraine will continue to be managed by bodies tied to the EU Military Command under the direction of Kallas and the member states. The ill-disposed see in the president of the Commission’s actions a continuous centralization of power at the expense of commissioners and even the High Representative: it’s the method von der Leyen also used during her first term, marked by small and large feuds with the rest of her executive. The well-disposed say this is a phase of adjustment and that the goal of unity remains a priority. The European Commission suddenly finds itself needing to build a new foreign and defense policy while Putin continues—indeed increases—the aggression against Ukraine and a new trade policy in response to Trump’s tariffs.
Kaja Kallas perhaps saw in her new post the opportunity to build a Europe ready for anything, combative, confident—and instead found herself in the grayness of a role that, who knows, maybe she will be the one to revolutionize. Not only Kallas, in short: the entire EU must learn a whole new trade. To arm itself, to defend against Russian aggression, to learn to manage solitude after the withdrawal—and hostility—of the United States. Above all, to abandon all the illusions that have taken root in eighty years of alliance with America and thirty-five years of transforming the relationship with Russia. It takes courage and imagination, as well as everyone’s collaboration, to make the European beacon of freedom shine and light up those who ended up in the dark—or went there to hide.
The Eurosceptics have never stopped fighting to take us out. Now, armed with evidence of the damage suffered and a better vision of what could be, in a world where alliances will be essential for all countries, large and small, we must fight to bring ourselves back to where we should be: leaders in Europe.
